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This chapter sets out the basic principles of economics of bus operations, examining costing 
and pricing concepts. Other factors affecting demand and market share vis a vis other modes 
are considered. The impacts of different regulatory systems are then examined. The main 
emphasis is on evidence from Britain, given the extensive experience of different regulatory 
systems and the research literature available, but international aspects are also examined, 
notably through cases with sharp variations in regulatory practice (especially Chile) and the 
growing internationalisation of the contract market. The main focus throughout is on ‘local’ 
bus services (i.e. those stopping at frequent intervals, mainly kerbside, handling short 
passenger trips), but reference is also made to the experience of express coach deregulation 
which has produced somewhat different outcomes to that of local buses.
2.2 The structure of operating costs
2.2.1 The typical pattern in Britain
Table 2.1 shows a recent estimate of the percentage composition of local bus operating costs 
in Britain, based on work by the TAS consultancy. It can be seen that the largest element is 
those costs related directly to staff, at 60% of total costs (of which drivers comprise about 
40%). Components related to distance run (fuel and spare parts) are approximately 20%, and 
costs associated with vehicle provision, i.e. depreciation and leasing, form about 10%. 
Overheads comprise about 9%. Staff-related costs tend to form a larger proportion in the case 
of operators in London and the South East, reflecting higher staff earnings, and the other 
elements by definition form a smaller proportion (but are not lower in absolute terms).
<TABLE 2.1 HERE>
A broadly equivalent pattern may be assumed in other countries of similar real income per 
head levels, although the fuel cost component will vary according to taxation policy (see 
further discussion below). The fuel element also varies more sharply within a given country 
in the short term, due to fluctuations in world oil prices. In lower-income countries (such as 
India) labour forms a smaller proportion of the total, and fuel a relatively larger one.
It follows from this structure that most costs vary by time, rather than distance as such. The 
purely distance-based element (fuel, tyres and spares) is relatively small, in the order of 20%. 
Nonetheless, unit costs continue to be expressed usually in terms of distance, both in 
operators’ own data and those published by government. However, the value of time-based 
costs as better indicator was pointed out over sixty years ago (Buckpitt, 1949). The other 
important component is that associated with vehicle provision, normally expressed as a 
charge per vehicle per annum. Where a fleet is directly owned, this will comprise the 
depreciation charge due, or where leased, the leasing charge. Overhead costs, and those for 
administrative staff, are also generally allocated on a vehicle numbers basis, since the scale of 
depots and administrative structure are largely determined by this. A distinction may also be 
drawn between ‘peak vehicle requirement’ (PVR), i.e. the number of vehicles in service at 
the busiest period (typically the morning or afternoon peak, Monday to Friday), and total fleet 
size (which also includes vehicles undergoing maintenance). Typically a well-maintained 
fleet renewed at regular intervals will have an availability of about 90% - i.e. a PVR of 90 
would correspond to a fleet operated of 100 – but may be lower where older fleets are 
operated.
As a simple measure of unit operating costs, total bus-kilometres run may be divided into 
total costs to give an operating cost per bus-kilometre run. While useful in assessing trends 
over time (as in British data discussed further below) and making cross-sectional 
comparisons (subject to broadly similar operating conditions being applicable) this is a poor 
guide to the allocation of costs within an operation. It also measures an intermediate output 
(bus kilometres), rather than the ultimate output being produced (passenger trips or 
passenger-km), which is affected by average load carried. Government data published in 
Britain also cover cost per passenger trip (which do not distinguish trip length effects). In 
London, a more comprehensive approach is found, TfL publishing estimates of total resource 
cost (including capital) per passenger kilometre by all public transport modes, averaging 
about 23 pence in 2014-15 (TfL 2015, table 5.1)
2.2.2 Allocating costs within a network
In allocating costs to specific parts of an operation (such as a particular route or time period) 
the following factors will also apply:
1. The PVR for the service, determining both vehicle capital costs and overhead 
allocation. Labour costs for peak-only operations may also be higher per hour worked, 
due to difficulties in scheduling efficiently for this purpose (even where ‘split shift’ 
working is followed, average labour cost per hour is normally higher than for ‘straight 
shift’ work). Hence, operations carried out mainly at peak periods tend to have much 
higher unit costs per bus-km than those running for most of the day.
2. Average speed attained, since the higher the speed the lower the time-based costs per 
km run.
3. Vehicle size. Capital costs, fuel consumption and maintenance clearly rise with 
vehicle size, although not necessarily pro rata. Labour cost may also vary, although 
this will depend on the pattern of local working agreements – for example, in the 
immediate post-deregulation phase in Britain (from 1986) much lower rates were 
often negotiated for ‘minibus’ drivers (locally defined), encouraging widespread 
adoption of this vehicle type. However, in the longer-term, a market-based wage will 
tend to reflect the local labour market rather than vehicle size as such, and in Britain 
this regional variation is now much more noticeable than the vehicle size component, 
removing an artificial incentive to the use of smaller vehicles.  While total operating 
costs rise with vehicle size, unit costs per passenger place-km generally fall sharply.
4. Unit costs at periods of low demand (typically early mornings, evenings, and 
Sundays; and all-night where such operations are run) will often be lower in bus-
kilometre terms, especially if a marginal or escapable costing approach is adopted, 
since costs of overheads and vehicle provision have already been incurred in meeting 
peak demand. However, wage agreements may vary (e.g. higher rates for Sunday 
work), affecting the degree to which marginal operating costs per hour run are lower 
or higher than weekday work.  In many cases, although costs per bus-km are lower 
than  the overall average at such times, cost per passenger trip may be high due to 
poor loadings, often resulting in such services being provided only on a tendered basis 
even where ‘commercial’ services operate over the same route during Monday-
Saturday daytime periods.
Growing congestion, and the need to ensure service reliability, may thus increase costs even 
where no increase in service frequency takes place. For example, a route with a round trip 
time of 60 minutes and headway of 6 minutes would require 10 buses and drivers.  Even a 
very small increase in round trip time (up to 6 minutes) would thus increase this to 11 buses 
(i.e. 10%), so that total cost will rise by about 8% (if 20% of costs are distance-related), and 
unit cost per bus-km likewise. The most effective means of reducing costs, irrespective of 
ownership or regulatory pattern, may simply be to increase speeds, through bus priorities and 
reducing  dwell time at stops (for example, by minimising cash fare payment, now 
completely eliminated in London). Increased congestion also tends to worsen fuel 
consumption and increase emissions. Recent work by Begg (2016) has shown dramatic 
increases in scheduled bus journey times over the long term in a number of urban areas, with 
direct effects on passenger demand (due to greater in-vehicle journey time), and operating 
costs, plus large secondary impacts where fares are then raised to reflect higher costs.
In contrast to evening and Sunday work, the ‘inter-peak’ period (that between approximately 
0900 and 1600) often attracts reasonably good loadings (notably due to free concessionary 
travel for older people), and the avoidable cost of cutting services substantially below the 
peak levels at such times may be small, especially if shift-working agreements involve 
commitments to minimum shift time and pay. Coupled with the high marginal costs of peak-
only operation, this has resulted in most operators in Britain offering a similar service level 
throughout the period between around 0800 and 1800 with only small enhancements at the 
peaks, often to meet school travel demand, rather than adult journeys to/from work. Recent 
aggregate data indicates little variation in the number of journeys operated within this period, 
but a sharp drop in the evenings, especially outside London (Department for Transport 2014).
2.2.3 Economies of scale
A further consequence of this cost structure is that few economies of scale in direct operating 
costs may be expected, since the main components (drivers, other staff, fuel and spares) 
simply rise in proportion to service output. One might expect some economies of scale by 
depot size, as overheads are split between more vehicles, but the enquiry by the then 
Competition Commission (2011) only found some limited evidence for economies of scale by 
depot sizei (for ‘small’ depots) . In the light of this, the consolidation of the industry post-
deregulation into five major operating groups may seem surprising. It should be borne in 
mind, however, that large organisations may have bargaining power with suppliers in 
purchase of fuel, spares and vehicles not available to smaller operators. They may also be 
able to raise capital more easily (either by being seen as lower-risk by lenders, or being able 
to raise equity capital on the stock market), and find insurance easier to obtain (or cover some 
risks such as vehicle fire and theft internally).
2.3 Operator income and profitability
The principal source of operator income in Britain is revenue from passengers, whether 
through cash transactions on the vehicle, or off-vehicle ticketing. In addition, compensation is 
received from local authorities for the net cost (mainly in lost revenue) of offering 
concessionary fares to certain passenger categories (principally those aged over about 60). 
The ‘fuel duty rebate’ introduced in the 1970s offset much of the duty payable on fuel, at a 
level of 80% until recently – the effect of this was to greatly reduce net fuel costs incurred, 
affecting in particular marginal costs of services. The grant is now known as ‘Bus Services 
Operator Grant’ (BSOG), and is based on a more complex formula, incentivising fuel-
efficient vehicles and smartcard tickets, but to a large extent remains as a rebate on fuel duty. 
In defining a ’commercial’ service an operator thus includes all three sources of income. 
Likewise, where contract payments are received for particular services, this forms part of an 
operator’s business income. Practice in other countries varies, often with compensation paid 
for low fares levels offered to many categories of passengerii
A return on capital invested will be expected. Where capital has been raised by loan finance, 
this will appear as a ‘cost’, but where equity capital is employed it will be in the form of 
dividend paid out of profits.
A simple measure of profitability is the return on sales (ROS) margin, usually defined as 
earnings before interest and taxation (EBIT) as a percentage of total revenue. This provides a 
quick measure for comparing profit margins over time and between operators. However, a 
more appropriate measure may be the return on capital employed (ROCE). This raises 
somewhat more complex questions of placing a value on the assets of the business, examined 
in some detail in the then Competition Commission report on the industryiii (2011). 
2.4 The demand for bus services, and elasticity values
2.4.1 Major trip purposes and other market features
The demand for local bus services is characterised by a wide mix of journey purposes, and 
not dominated by the adult journey to work to the extent that may be assumed. Table 2.2 
shows data from the National Travel Survey (DfT 2015) indicating the composition of local 
bus demand by trip purpose, and the share which bus holds of travel by all modes for that 
purpose.
<TABLE 2.2 HERE>
It can be seen that shopping forms the largest single element of bus journeys (25.4%), and 
also a purpose within which bus holds its second highest market share (8.6%). As a proxy for 
peak demand, the work and education trip purposes may be taken together (37.2% of all bus 
trips). The trips for all other purposes, which, broadly speaking, occur at other times, form a 
majority of total bus trips (62.8%). This mix produces a fairly good balance of peak and inter-
peak demand, albeit with the risk that dependence on shopping as a trip purpose may be 
affected by the shift of activity away from traditional urban centres and growth in internet 
shopping. It should be noted that work trips are somewhat longer than those for other 
purposes, and thus form a greater share of bus travel when total passenger-km are used as the 
base.
The NTS also indicates the relatively higher share of demand taken by local bus among the 
youngest and oldest age groups, namely those still in education and younger adults, and those 
who are retired. Market penetration in the working-age adult group is more limited.
A correlation may also be found between car ownership, income levels and bus use. 
Typically, bus use is concentrated in lower income groups and inversely correlated with car 
ownership. Hence, rising car ownership will, ceteris paribus, cause a reduction in bus use. It 
should be borne in mind, however, that a considerable scatter is seen around the broad trend, 
with certain areas, such as Poole, Oxfordshire and Brighton & Hove, having higher bus use 
(trips per head per annum) than would be expected from a linear regression of bus trip rates 
against car ownership  (KPMG 2016, figure 22). Furthermore, even for a given pattern of 
income and car ownership, bus operators may be able to substantially influence demand 
action to improve service quality.
2.4.2 Elasticities of demand
A consequence of the relatively local nature of demand, and limited modal alternatives 
available, is that short-run demand elasticities for bus travel are relatively low. Typically, for 
price an average short-run elasticity of about -0.4 may be assumed (a 10% real fares rise 
would cause a drop in demand of about 4% over about one year), and for service level 
(expressed as bus-kilometres run) a value of about +0.4 (i.e. a 10% increase in service level 
would cause a 4% increase in demand). For this purpose, changes in bus-kilometres run 
largely correspond to changes in service frequency, although they will also reflect changes in 
network size and periods of time services are operated. There is some evidence of variations 
around these averages associated with trip purpose (Balcombe et al 2004) and peak/off-peak 
periods, although not always conclusive (Molnar and Nesheim 2010). Very short trips (below 
2 km) may be more price-sensitive due to the ease of modal substitution by foot or cycle. 
Evidence from recent service improvements in Australia and New Zealand (Wallis 2013) 
indicates much higher service level elasticities with respect to vehicle-km run for periods 
such as evenings and weekends, of up to 1.1. A wider review of pricing issues is provided in 
the chapter by Mulley and Batarce.  
Over a longer period, elasticities tend to be of greater magnitude  since greater scope exists 
for substitution by travellers –for example, bringing forward a car purchase decision, or 
changing travel patterns to reduce frequency of non-work trips.
A further consequence of these elasticities is that, at least in the short-run, operators may be 
able to increase fares in real terms yet nonetheless obtain a net increase in revenue (for 
example, if 100 trips are made at £1 per trip, revenue is £100. A price increase of 10%, to 
£1.10, would cause a demand reduction to 96 trips, but the new revenue level would be 96 x 
1.10 = £105.6). Likewise, a reduction in service, if producing a pro rata reduction in costs, 
would reduce total cost by 10% but with a lesser reduction in revenue. However, given the 
evidence of much higher price elasticities in the long-term, such an increase could come close 
to being self-defeating. For example, if the long-run elasticity were about –0.80, the net 
increase in revenue would be reduced to about £1.20.
2.5 Developments prior to deregulation
The effects of external changes and the industry’s response may be traced from the 1960s, as 
bus demand declined from high levels in the 1950s, due to the impact of growing car 
ownership. The initial effect was a reduction in demand, to which operators responded by 
increases in real fares and cutting service levels. These in turn caused further decline (a 
‘vicious circle’ effect) but nonetheless restored a revenue:cost balance. Further impacts were 
caused by real cost increases, especially as labour costs rose, stimulating further service 
reductions and/or fare increases. Furthermore, reductions in service levels at off-peak periods 
did not necessarily produce pro rata cost savings (for reasons connected with cost structure, 
as noted above). The clearest attempt to reduce cost per bus-km was by replacing on-board 
conductors by one-person-operation (opo), although this saving was to some extent offset by 
increased running time due to extra dwell time at stops, and service quality was worsened due 
to slower in-vehicle journeys. 
Innovation may also have been deterred by the regulatory system which protected existing 
operators, and made competition (either through bidding for service contracts, or ‘on the 
road’) very difficult. Having  said this, some useful innovation had occurred during the 1960s 
and 1970s, notably through adoption of ‘Travelcard’ ticketing, in which cards giving  
unlimited travel within designated zones and periods to the holder avoided the need for cash 
transactions on-vehicle, and also stimulated additional travel through convenience and the 
zero marginal cost of extra trips  This was most noteworthy in the West Midlands, which 
introduced this policy at the same time as a marked shift to opo from the early 1970s (thus 
avoiding substantial increases in dwell time), soon followed by other Passenger Transport 
Executive areas. London did not follow suit until the 1980s (White 2009). 
Powers to finance bus services enabled public authorities, especially those in the then 
metropolitan counties, to reduce fare levels and increase service levels, thus offsetting the 
negative effects of car ownership (using the elasticity effects described above), most notably 
in South Yorkshire, but this incurred high levels of public expenditure, and there were 
concerns about ‘leakage’ occurring in payments to inefficient incumbent operators. A further 
consequence of the regulatory system had been the deliberate encouragement of ‘cross-
subsidy’ in which profitable operations offset losses elsewhere within the same operator’s 
network when applied on a large scale, for example between low car-owning housing estates 
and more affluent suburbs. This was clearly regressive, in that the lower income areas tended 
to be those in which bus operation was profitable. However, the shift under deregulation may 
have been taken too far, treating daytime and evening markets as separate, whereas over the 
same route these often comprise different legs of trip chains made by the same individuals.
2.6 Deregulation in Britain
2.6.1 The outcome of express coach deregulation
The first major change in Britain came about through deregulation of the express coach 
system in October 1980 under the Transport Act of that year. Both local buses and the coach 
sector had been regulated under the Road Traffic Act of 1930, but its effects may have been 
more marked in the latter sector, which began to develop somewhat later than local buses. By 
1930 an intensive local bus network already existed in most areas, the main effect of the Act 
being to enable consolidation of such operators into larger regional companies without fear of 
further competition. Concurrently, express coach development may have been limited at a 
critical early stage (nonetheless express coaches competing with rail were able to continue, in 
contrast to the virtual prohibition of such services in most mainland European countries).
In addition to factors affecting costs described for local bus services above, seasonality had 
major effects on vehicle utilisation, and thus on unit costs. Direct operating costs per vehicle-
km were typically lower than those for local buses, due to much higher average speeds. Price 
elasticity is generally higher in the express coach sector, in the order of -1.0 in the short run  
(White, 2001), due to the greater degree of modal competition (at least on trunk routes) and 
mix of trip purposes, with a high proportion of discretionary travel (such as visiting friends 
and relatives).
The ‘deregulation’ was extensive, removing previous controls on routes operated, timetabling 
and fares charged. However, quality regulation of safety-related aspects was strengthened 
through the operator licensing system.
The outcomes of express coach deregulation included a large growth in ridership, of about 
50% by 1986, with strong price competition on the trunk routes and an overall reduction in 
price levels. Frequencies, network coverage and service quality were improved. Although 
there were some cases of service cuts in low-density regions due to loss of cross-subsidy, the 
overall effect may be judged as generally beneficial. In particular, lower-income users 
gained, both through the coach service offer itself and effects in stimulating lower prices 
competition for the off-peak discretionary market by rail. However, the impacts of smaller 
operators were limited. While many entered the market on deregulation, these were often 
short-lived. The principal operator, National Express, remained dominant. A major factor 
may have been the importance of network effects, offering interconnecting services at major 
hubs, and the marketing strength of large operators. Access to terminals was also a factor. A 
fuller review is provided by White and Robbins (2012).
The decision to deregulate local bus services under the Transport Act 1985 may have been 
influenced by the success of the coach deregulation. However, its outcome also suggested 
that simplistic views on the scope for smaller operators to compete may not have been valid, 
but this lesson did not appear to have been drawn. Furthermore, the different context (notably 
the mix of trip purposes and resultant price elasticity) may have made extrapolation of the 
express coach outcome to local buses questionable.
2.6.2 The main components of local bus deregulation in Britain
One difficulty in analysing the impacts of local bus deregulation is the near-simultaneous 
abolition of the metropolitan counties from 1 April 1986. This removed the powers of such 
authorities to provide high levels of comprehensive financial support, resulting in large fare 
increases and some service cuts, notably in South Yorkshire. Deregulation of local bus 
services as such followed from 26 October 1986. As in the case of express coaches, it 
removed controls over routes and timetables. Fares regulation had been largely removed 
under the 1980 Act, but with limited effect in operator behaviour. In contrast to express 
coach, a route registration process has remained in place, hence an inventory of routes and 
timetables can be compiled. A period of notice was stipulated (42 days) for operators register 
a new service, or amending the route or timetable of an existing service.
It thus became easier for new operators to enter the market, simply by obtaining an operator 
licence, and then registering the service(s) they planned to run. While an operator licence 
specified the number of vehicles an operator was allowed to run at any one time, this was 
based primarily on adequacy of maintenance facilities (and, later, financial resources) rather 
than forming a quantity limit on the industry as a whole.
Although often associated with deregulation, privatisation was not coincident with it (indeed, 
in the express coach case, the intensive competition between National Express and British 
Rail in the early 1980s took place when both were in public ownership). However, central 
government took the initiative to privatise those operators directly under its ownership (the 
National Bus Company in England and Wales, and Scottish Bus Group within Scotland). 
Municipal operators (those owned by local authorities, mainly in larger urban areas) were 
permitted to continue in public ownership, but as “arm’s length” businesses, hence taken out 
of direct political control,  and separately managed from the local authority as such. They 
were not permitted to receive general subsidies, and had to bid for contracted services on the 
same basis as other operators. In practice their owning authorities were often willing to 
accept lower profit margins than required in privatised companies. Over time, most of the 
municipal operators have been privatised, including all of those in the former metropolitan 
counties. However, those remaining have often provided high quality services – for example, 
both Reading Buses and Lothian Buses [Edinburgh] have won several awards at the annual 
UK Bus Awards in recent years.
London was not subject to deregulation, and a comprehensive public authority was retained. 
Bus operations were shifted from the monopolist London Regional Transport (LRT) to a mix 
of local subsidiaries of that body (all later privatised), and operators new to the London 
market, gaining service contracts through competitive tendering, creating incentives to 
control costs and raise service quality, LRT specifying the service level to be provided. A 
common fare scale was retained, and a ‘gross cost’ contract system adopted, in which 
revenue was retained by LRT. Each route formed a separate contract, thus making it easier 
for smaller operators to enter the market (in contrast to network-wide contracts in French 
cities, for example). The London system thus formed an experimental (albeit unintentional) 
‘control’ case against which the fully-deregulated system elsewhere could be compared. 
However, London is also subject to many specific features which make direct comparisons, 
even with the larger conurbations, difficult. A preferable approach would have been a 
genuine experiment in which some of the other conurbations had been subject to a system of 
control similar to that in London. This would also have avoided the issue of potentially 
compensating private operators where a form of re-regulation is now proposed through 
quality contracts (discussed further below).
Under the deregulation of 1986 it was assumed that most services would be operated 
commercially, i.e. user fares, fuel duty rebate (now BSOG) and concessionary fare 
compensation would cover all costs (including a profit margin for the operator). It was 
accepted, however, that a number of services could not be provided on this basis, especially 
in low-density rural areas. Provisions were therefore introduced for contracted services to be 
provided in such cases. The local authority specifies the service(s) to be provided, fares 
typically following commercial services in the same area. These generally fill gaps in the 
commercial network, both in low-density areas, and also during times of day (typically 
evenings and Sundays) when a commercial service is not registered. The commercial and 
tendered services thus display considerable intermixing rather than forming separate 
networks. Most provision is through competitive bidding, but powers also exist for ‘de 
minimus’ negotiated contracts when smaller sums are involved. Unlike provision of statutory 
school transport and compensation for concessionary travel, powers for tendered services are 
purely discretionary, not mandatory, and there is no general obligation on local authorities to 
ensure a particular level of service – indeed, several now make no provision for tendered 
services whatsoever. In practice, about 80% of local bus-kilometres outside London have 
been operated commercially, the balance tendered, with some fluctuation from year to year.
2.6.3 Outcomes of local bus deregulation
These may be divided into two main periods:
(a) 1986 to about 2000, characterised by a phase of intensive (but generally not sustained) 
inter-operator competition, an increase in bus-km run, and a very sharp reduction in 
real unit cost per bus-km (both in London and the deregulated region). However, 
ridership losses continued, which combined with increased bus-km run, resulted in a 
marked drop in average load outside London, and an approximately stable cost per 
passenger trip made. In London, loadings were retained, resulting in a similar drop in 
cost per passenger trip to that in cost per bus-km. Total public expenditure fell 
sharply.
(b) About 2000 to the present. The rate of passenger decline outside London slowed, with 
a more stable network and greater focus on service quality, together with the effect of 
universal free travel for older people. In London, marked growth in service levels and 
other factors resulted in a very large growth in ridership. However, cost per bus-km 
has risen substantially (both within and outside London) and public expenditure has 
grown rapidly – outside London mainly due to concessionary compensation and 
within London due to a shift from a break-even position to one involving very high 
levels of support.
Tables 2.3 to 2.5 provide fuller details of trends in service output, fares, ridership, and unit 
costs; operator income composition; and public expenditure. Limitations are imposed by 
some discontinuities in data available, notably for unit costs in London after 2007. However, 
some recent data published by TfL (2015) does enable an estimate of trends in real cost per 
bus-km between 2010-11 and 2013-14, suggesting a reduction of about 3% in real terms, 
albeit from a fairly high absolute leveliv. Note that 1985/86 is taken as a ‘base year’, i.e. prior 
to the effects of both metropolitan counties’ abolition and introduction of deregulation.
<TABLES 2.3 TO 2.5 HERE>
The sharp drop in real unit costs per bus-km, of about 45% by 1999/2000, both in London 
and the deregulated areas (White 2014), may be explained by several factors:
- Large staff reductions, especially in engineering and administrative functions;
- Increased productivity of drivers, partly through ‘flattening out’ of peak:off-peak 
service ratios, producing better driver and vehicle utilisation during the working day;
- Use of smaller vehicles, notably minibuses;
- Changes in working conditions and pay, with marked regional variations.
Whereas before 1986 operators had made incremental service cuts in response to lost 
ridership, and cut out conductors, deregulation and the threat of competition had a marked 
effect in forcing a rethink on the whole pattern of working. As services had been cut back, 
central engineering workshops and administrative structures had not necessarily experienced 
proportionate reductions. Increased service levels, especially between peaks, reversed a long-
term trend of decline in provision.  One may thus consider the effects of deregulation (outside 
London) and competitive tendering (within London) in respect of cost per bus-km and 
increased service levels to be beneficial.  However, poorer wages and working conditions 
represented a loss to workers in the industry. Furthermore, insofar as some of them became 
eligible for forms of family public assistance due to low incomes, some of the cost savings in 
the transport budget may have been offset by increased public spending elsewhere.
The substantial increases in costs since 2000 may be attributed to:
- A need to improve wages and working conditions, in order to recruit sufficient staff, 
especially up to the recession in 2008. The recent KPMG study (2016, page 26) 
indicates a 21% rise in bus driver weekly real earnings between 2000 and 2013  Very 
marked regional differences exist, with some areas displaying high living costs (such 
as London and Oxford) needing to offer substantially better conditions than 
elsewhere;
- A need to insert additional vehicles and drivers into running schedules as congestion 
worsened, simply to maintain the same frequency (as illustrated earlier), and also 
ensure adequate reliability Whereas in the earlier phases of deregulation, the Traffic 
Commissioners were largely concerned with safety matters, increased emphasis has 
been placed on running reliable services in accordance with the timetable registered, 
and applying penalties where this has not been done. In the London case, explicit 
incentives are built into contracts (using the excess waiting time indicator). This has 
been particularly noteworthy in the last three years. The KMPG study (2016, figure 9) 
indicates a broadly stable productivity in terms of bus miles per member of staff 
between 2004/05 and 2013/14, in contrast to the improvement shown during the 
earlier phase of deregulation.
- Increases in some other costs, such as insurance.
Despite these increases, real unit costs per bus-km remain substantially below those in 
1985/6. 
In terms of ridership and passenger benefits, a much more mixed picture emerges. As table 
2.3 shows, while aggregate service levels improved, fare levels rose substantially in all 
sectors. The especially large increase in the metropolitan areas was partly due to the abolition 
of met counties, but nonetheless real increases continued in that sector, and also elsewhere. 
Whereas competition succeeded in bringing down costs, and increasing total service output, it 
did not produce aggregate fare reductions, even where operations had been fairly close to 
break-even prior to deregulation and some of the reduction in costs might have been passed 
on in lower fares. Where competition developed, it appeared to be based largely on service 
frequency, rather than fare levels as such (van der Veer, 2002), hence approximating to 
classic oligopolistic behaviour. A probable factor is the low short-run price elasticity, 
meaning that lower fares would produce an aggregate reduction in industry revenue despite 
ridership growth (compared with the higher elasticity in the express coach service, which 
produced an approximately stable real total revenue where fare changes occurred). 
Furthermore, given the disutility of waiting time, passengers tend to board the first bus to 
arrive rather than wait a possibly uncertain period for one with lower fares. 
Underlying these changes were negative factors affecting bus ridership, notably rising car 
ownership, which has an effect irrespective of bus industry regulation or ownership. One 
means of looking at this effect is to consider the NTS evidence on bus trip rates by car 
ownership. In the case of non-car households, bus trip rates were little changed in the period 
to 1992-94 (White 1997), consistent with the effects of rising real fares and increased service 
levels offsetting each other (as one might expect, given the similar percentage changes, and 
magnitude of elasticities). However, in car-owning households the bus trip rate declined.
The contrast with London is very clear. Within the first phase, broadly stable ridership was 
retained. In the second phase, analysis is made somewhat more complex by the effects of 
major improvements in service level. Briefly, the growth appears to be greater than applying 
existing elasticity values for fare and service changes would suggest, also affected by factors 
such as the more comprehensive nature of the service (growth has been fastest for evening 
and Sunday use), reduction in the share of trips made on cash fares and their subsequent 
complete elimination (improving speed and reliability), extensive bus priorities, etc.  External 
factors have also been favourable in the London case, notably a broadly stable car ownership 
per head from the mid-1990s, compared with strong growth (from a low base) in some of the 
older conurbations elsewhere. Population growth and a high level of economic activity have 
also assisted bus use.
2.7 Evaluating the outcomes of deregulation and competition
The effects on producers, workers, consumers and public spending can be brought together 
by using cost-benefit analysis, or by modelling of changes. These may necessitate a 
‘counterfactual’ case being proposed against which the outcomes are assessed. An early 
approach by the author (White 1990) indicated that a net benefit might be estimated from the 
London outcome, but negative in areas outwith London and the former Metropolitan 
Counties )(‘mets’). In the case of the mets , a benefit emerged from deregulation as such, due 
to a reduction in costs, treating separately the effects of large fare increases following met 
counties’ abolition. A much more recent analysis by Preston and Alumtairi (2014) indicates a 
similar outcome (dependent on modelling frameworks employed). Cowie (2014) uses 
disaggregate data at the level of individual operators to identify five clusters of performance , 
suggesting that only two of the clusters (representing about 30% of the cases) was a net user 
benefit observed..
A major issue arising is the role of competition, which has greatly diminished since the early 
phase of deregulation. The Competition Commission found that only 2.5% of services 
experienced effective head-to-head competition over their whole lengthv Given the aggregate 
nature of data available, it is not always possible to examine localised evidence where 
competition has occurred to see whether better outcomes were provided, as this would entail 
analysis at a route or corridor, rather than area, level: for example, the attitude surveys by 
Transport Focus cover somewhat larger areas than individual corridors, and it would be 
impracticable to increase sample size on the scale required (House of Commons Transport 
Committee 2012). While individual examples can be found of competition inducing 
improvements in service levels and/or lower fares (Colson 1996), the overall effects appear 
limited. In many cases, a commercially-viable service may be sustainable for one operator, 
but demand is not sufficient to support two or more operators in the long run. Hence at the 
local level a monopoly often exists, irrespective of whether the operator is locally-owned, or 
part of a larger group.
These issues were examined in the extensive study carried out by the then Competition 
Commission (2011). Factors inhibiting competition included the problems of setting up an 
operating base in the ‘territory’ of another operator, and the tendency of users to board the 
first bus to arrive. Despite limited evidence for economies of scale, consolidation in the 
industry has produced an outcome in which about 70% of the turnover is represented by five 
large groups (Stagecoach, First, Arriva, Go Ahead, National Express). The Commission 
found that these groups collectively produced a rate of return on capital employed of 13.5%, 
3.8 percentage points above the ‘normal’ cost of capital of 9.7%. 
A number of ‘remedies’ were examined by the Commission (albeit not including the option 
of London-style contracting in its final report, despite considering this as an option at an 
earlier stage of its enquiry). These included scope for more extensive inter-operator ticketing 
(dominance by a major operator of products such as travelcards may make market entry by 
small operators more difficult), easier access to bus stations, and a more open process for net 
cost bidding. Changes introduced to date have been more limited, primarily relating to station 
access. It also planned to extend the ‘block exemption’ to competition rules which otherwise 
inhibit inter-operator ticketing, and to make operation of pay as you go smartcards within this 
framework easier.
A particular issue arising from the monopolistic nature of local operations and the low 
demand elasticities is that an operator can substantially increase real fares and/or cut services, 
while facing little threat of competition, even though the operator is not pursuing ‘anti-
competitive’ actions as such. It would therefore be possible for an operator to transfer a 
substantial consumer surplus into a producer surplus. In the long run, however, higher 
elasticities may make this course of action less attractive, as the underlying core market is 
diminished.  Conversely, an innovative operator could also achieve a similarly high profit 
margin (at the level causing concern to the Competition Commission) by offering an 
attractive service, increasing revenue and profit margin by increasing passenger volume at a 
given fare level. These issues are examined in more detail elsewhere by the author (White 
2014).
A particularly noteworthy case has been that of First Group, which followed a policy similar 
to the first hypothetical example described above. Current management has adopted a very 
different approach, candidly describing the previous image of the company as “..starved of 
investment, with a culture of cuts and price hikes..” (Fearnley 2015). In some cases, First has 
faced direct competition from other operators within the same area, whose market share has 
grown as a result, notably with Stagecoach in Sheffield. In other areas, there has been 
relatively limited direct ‘on the road’ competition, but nonetheless a marked change in 
management approach has been evident. This has been assisted by the regular attitude 
surveys carried out by Transport Focus, which have measured indicators such as ‘Value for 
Money’ (VfM) by named operator as well as area. Particularly poor results were observed for 
First in the Greater Manchester area (where it is dominant in the northern half of the 
conurbation), and Bristol. These have stimulated substantial fare reductions by First, resulting 
in a marked change in VfM ‘satisfaction’  – for example, in the Bristol area from 33% in 
2012  to 61% in 2014 (Transport Focus 2016). This has been associated with substantial 
ridership growth. One can thus argue that explicit comparisons with performance elsewhere 
may cause management action, even in the absence of direct competition. In effect, a self-
correcting mechanism may exist, albeit applying on a very long timescale.
The extent to which a larger number of operators serving a given area will stimulate higher 
bus use can be tested by comparing bus trip rate per head with the degree of market 
concentration. Government data in Britain now show market shares within each local 
authority area in England (albeit measured by numbers of registered bus [vehicular] trips, 
rather than passenger volumes). Expressing this in the form of a Herfindahl index indicates 
no systematic correlation between low concentration and high bus use - if anything, the 
opposite can be seen in cases such a Brighton & Hove (KPMG, 2016, figure 24). It should be 
noted, however, that a low degree of concentration may merely imply a large number of 
operators running within a given area – they may simply serve different parts of that area (as 
in Surrey, for example) rather than running in direct ‘on the road’ competition (but greater 
competition for tendered services in such cases would be beneficial to local authorities in 
controlling costs).
A further aspect of competitive behaviour is whether competition will necessarily arise to 
restore conditions where an incumbent had caused the local market to diminish through high 
fares and/or low service levels. An argument can be made that ‘success’ rather than ‘failure’ 
may attract competition, since a growing market can be more attractive to a new entrant (if 
one expects a market share of 10%, then  in absolute terms this will be greater in a growing 
market than a declining one, and hence more likely to justify commercial operation).  One 
can see in the case of Nottingham, which has an exceptionally high rate of bus use per head, 
not only competition between two local incumbents who have  stressed marketing and service 
innovations (Nottingham  City Transport and Trentbarton) but also saw entry by local 
independents, notably ‘Yourbus’.
2.8 Experience in other countries
In many respects the closest equivalent to the almost complete deregulation in Britain was 
that in Chile, especially the capital Santiago, from the late 1970s.The conditions this 
produced resulted in a very marked shift to a regulated system under public contracts. 
However, severe problems arose when the whole network was recast in one step as  
‘TransSantiago’, in 2007 (Munoz  and de Grange 2009). In contrast, the approach in the 
regulated London market has been one of incremental change in the network.
There are a few other cases of attempting to follow the deregulation of local bus service as 
such in countries of similar income per head to Britain. A deregulation of local bus services 
in Sweden in 2012 enabling the introduction of additional services, produced very little effect 
(Rye and Wreststrand 2014), perhaps not surprising given the comprehensive public network 
already offered, and low population density outside major cities. However, the positive 
outcome of the express coach case in Britain has been followed by deregulation or extensive 
liberalisation in several other European countries, notably Sweden and Norway, followed 
more recently by Germany (in 2013) and France (in 2015). Germany in particular has 
displayed very rapid growth (Augustin 2014), an initial phase of very strong inter-operator 
competition being followed by some consolidation and emergence of dominant operators.  
Stagecoach-owned Megabus expanded strongly, both in international services as such, and 
operation of wholly domestic express coach services within other EU states, although many 
of these services have now been taken over by the dominant German operator, Flixbus.
While ‘on the road’ local bus deregulation on the British model has not been followed 
elsewhere in Europe, there is concern regarding the value for money in supporting services of 
incumbent operators, and a shift to competitive bidding. In Scandinavia in particular, this has 
followed the London model of route-by-route contracts. The growth of a contracting market 
has also stimulated greater internationalisation of an industry which was previously 
dominated by publicly-owned domestic operators. For example, Arriva (formerly in British 
ownership, now a subsidiary of DB) expanded into several other EU member states. Within 
London’s very large market, substantial shares are held by non-UK operators (RATP of 
France, Abellio of the Netherlands, Comfort Delgro of Singapore and Tower Transit of 
Australia). A recent shift to competitive tendering in Singapore has resulted in Go Ahead 
securing gross cost contracts, and the Israeli co-operative Egged has gained contracts in the 
Netherlands.
2.9 Future policy implications
Reverting to the British case, a strong debate continues as to whether the London model 
could be adopted elsewhere, especially the other major conurbations. Powers to introduce 
‘quality contracts’ set out under the Transport Act 2000 and Local Transport Act 2008 have 
had no effect in practice to date. A proposal to introduce such a scheme in Tyne & Wear 
(T&W) was reviewed by a three-person panel, which indicated a negative outcome was likely 
overall. In particular, the loss of future profits by incumbent commercial operators was 
considered a major factor (Local Transport Today 2015), and if such compensation were to 
be paid, this would impose very high costs on the public sector.  
2.10 The Bus Services Bill 2016
In May 2016 the British government introduced a Bus Services Bill. At the time of writing 
(September 2016), it has been debated in the House of Lords (House of Lords 2016), with 
further stages yet to be completed. Enactment in 2017 appears probable.
The tone of the Bill is noteworthy for its marked contrast with the focus on competition per 
se in the 2011 report of the Competition Commission, and statements by its successor body, 
the Competition and Markets Authority (C&MA). The emphasis is on greater co-ordination 
of services, with mechanisms set out both for franchise-style operation, and more extensive 
partnerships between operators and local authorities. In brief, the main components are:
1. ‘Advanced Quality Partnership Schemes’ In contrast to existing statutory 
partnerships these would not depend on new infrastructure provision. Specified 
service standards may include frequency and/or timing. Maximum fare controls are 
also proposed. These powers would enable a greater degree of co-ordination than 
under previous competition policy, although common fare scale cannot be set.
2. ‘Franchising schemes’ can be adopted by Combined Authorities (CAs) with elected 
mayors, and by other types of authority (but in the latter cases the Secretary of State’s 
consent would be required). The requirements for consultation and audit are much 
less onerous than those arising in Tyne & Wear case. There would be no explicit 
compensation to existing operators for loss of profits, but no powers to take assets 
such as vehicles or land. However, a scheme could be revoked with six months’ 
notice on criteria including ‘financial difficulties’ for the authority (this could create 
substantial uncertainty for operators). The franchising authority would have powers to 
obtain information from operators for a period of up to five years before a proposed 
franchise, including trips, fares, revenue, and bus-kilometres run, thus removing some 
of the problems found in T&W case.
3. ‘Enhanced Partnership Plans and Schemes’. These create scope for greater co-
ordination, but without full franchising. They would be area rather than corridor-
based. A scheme may specify requirements on frequency and/or timing, and some 
other aspects (but not control of fares, except prices of multi-operator 
tickets).Registration of services to be with local authority.
4. Registration of Bus Services. Where an operator seeks to vary or cancel a 
registration, details are to be supplied of passenger trips, fare paid and revenue to the 
local authority [this removes an incumbent advantage which has existed for many 
years, enabling an operator which has deregistered a service on which it knows the 
revenue to make a net cost bid on this basis]
5. A new power would prohibit local authorities from setting up new bus companies in 
England (despite evidence of  good performance from some companies in this 
category, as noted above)
Responses from the operating industry generally favour the partnership approach rather than 
franchising, although a number of operators which have focussed on the latter approach (such 
as RATP Dev, and Tower Transit) have favoured its expansion.
2.11 Conclusions
The cost structure of local bus operation indicates little potential for direct operational 
economies of scale. However, where fairly complete deregulation has been attempted, as in 
the British case, consolidation into large groups has been observed. The extent of direct 
competition has been patchy, and in most cases the market appears insufficient to support 
more than one operator on a specific route in the long term. This in turn creates a danger of 
exploitation by increasing fares and/or cutting services, which on the road competition does 
not necessarily emerge to correct (but management attitudes may be influenced by evidence 
from other areas). It must be emphasised, however, that the aggregate nature of data available 
in Britain inhibits examination of competition effects on demand at a very local level.
Much clearer evidence exists for the potential to improve efficiency and reduce costs within a 
comprehensive framework through a system of competitive tendering (as in the London 
case), as is being increasingly adopted elsewhere.
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i See paragraph 9.181 of the Commission’s report.  A ‘small’ depot was defined as one handing fewer 
than 3.8 million passengers per annum – at 100,000 passengers per vehicle per annum, this would 
correspond to 38 vehicles.
ii A review of definitions is currently being conducted by UTIP (International Union of Public Transport)
iii See Part 10 of the Commission’s report
iv Author’s calculations from data in TfL 2015 pp 81 and 103, adjusted to real terms by RPI
vv Competition  Commission report, para 11.11(b)
